coverage of the test results, I also present results where human capital is only measured from years of schooling and health. It turns out that, at least in my preferred calibration, the addition or omission of cognitive skills (as measured by test scores) does not greatly a¤ect the quantitative results.
Given measures of physical capital gaps, as well gaps in the components of human capital, development-accounting uses a calibration to map these gaps into counter-factual income gaps, or the income gaps that would be observed based on di¤erences in human and capital endowments only. Because these counterfactual incomes are bundles of physical and human capital, I refer to the ratio of a country's counterfactual incomes to the US counterfactual income as relative capital.
I present results from two alternative calibrations, a "baseline" calibration and an "aggressive" calibration. The baseline calibration makes use of the existing body of mi-croeconomic estimates of the Mincerian framework in the way that most closely …ts the theoretical framework of development accounting. As it turns out, this leads to coe¢ cients for the mapping from the components of human capital to the index of human capital that are substantially lower than in much existing work in development accounting -leading to relatively smaller estimated capital gaps and, correspondingly, larger e¢ ciency gaps. The aggressive calibration thus uses more conventional …gures as a robustness check.
Under both the benchmark and the aggressive calibration I …nd very large e¢ ciency gaps. In the benchmark calibration, countries in the bottom decile of the world income distribution use their inputs only about 10% as e¢ ciently as the US; countries in the second decile are less than 20% as e¢ cient; at the third it's only little above 20%, and so on. The e¢ ciency of countries in the 9th decile of the income distribution is roughly 90% of the US level. The aggressive calibration implies higher relative e¢ ciency, but the gaps are still huge. For example at the 3rd decile of the income distribution e¢ ciency is 30% of the US level (against 20% in the benchmark calibration).
In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that e¢ ciency gaps contribute to income disparity both directly -as they mean that poorer countries get less out of their capital -and indirectly -since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished incentives to invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low e¢ ciency.
The consequences of closing the e¢ ciency gap would correspondingly be far reaching.
Conceptual Framework
The analytical tool at the core of development accounting is the aggregate production function. The aggregate production function maps aggregate input quantities into output. The main inputs considered are physical capital and human capital. The empirical literature so far has failed to uncover compelling evidence that aggregate input quantities deliver large external economies, so it is usually deemed safe to assume constant returns to scale. 2 Given this assumption, one can express the production function in intensive form, i.e. by specifying all input and output quantities in per worker terms. In order to construct counterfactual incomes a functional form is needed. Existing evidence suggests that the share of capital in income does not vary systematically with the level of development, or with factor endowments [Gollin (2002) ]. Hence, most practitioners of development accounting opt for a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation. In sum, the production function for country i is
where y is output per worker, k is physical capital per worker, h is human capital per worker (quality-adjusted labor), and A captures unmeasured/unobservable factors that contribute to di¤erences in output per worker.
The term A is subject to much speculation and controversy. Practitioners refer to it as total factor productivity, technology, a measure of our ignorance, etc. Here I will refer to it as "e¢ ciency". Countries with a larger A are countries that, for whatever reasons, are more e¢ cient users of their physical and human capital.
The goal of development accounting is to assess the relative importance of e¢ ciency di¤erences and physical and human capital di¤erences in producing the di¤erences in income per worker we observe in the data. To this end, one constructs counterfactual incomes, or capital bundles,ỹ
which are based exclusively on the observable inputs. Di¤erences in these capital bundles are then compared to income di¤erences. If counter-factual and actual income di¤erences are similar, then observable factors are able to account for the bulk of the variation in income. If they are quite di¤erent, then di¤erences in e¢ ciency are important. Establishing how signi…cant e¢ ciency di¤erences are has important repercussions both for research and for policy.
In order to construct the counterfactualỹs we need to construct measures of k i and h i , as well as to calibrate the capital-share parameter . Standard practice sets the latter to 0.33, and we stick to this practice throughout the main body of the paper. In the appendix I present robustness checks using a larger capital share, i.e. 0.40. This higher share implies somewhat larger capital gaps and somewhat smaller e¢ ciency gaps, though the main message of the paper is unchanged.
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The rest of this section focuses on the measurement of physical and human capital.
Existing development-accounting calculations measure k exclusively on the basis of reproducible capital (equipment and structures). But in most developing countries, where agricultural and mining activities still represent large shares of GDP, natural capital (land, timber, ores, etc.) is also very important. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that omitting natural capital can lead to very signi…cant understatements of total capital in developing countries relative to developed ones. Hence, this study will measure k as the sum of the value of all reproducible and natural capital. 
In this equation, s i measures average years of schooling in the working-age population, r i is a measure of health in the population, and t i is a measure of cognitive skills. The coe¢ cients s , r , and t map di¤erences in the corresponding variables into di¤erences in human capital. The model in (3) is attractive because it o¤ers a strategy for calibration of the parame-3 There may well be signi…cant heterogeneity among countries in the value of . However, it is not known how to perform development-accounting with country-speci…c capital shares. This is because measures of the capital stock are indices, so that a requirement for the exercise to make sense is that the results should be invariants to the units in which k is measured. Now
is not. 4 Some caveats as to the validity of of the functional form assumption in (3) are in order. There is considerable micro and macro evidence against the assumption that workers wiith di¤erent years of schooling are perfect substitutes [e.g. Caselli and Coleman (2006) ]. In this paper I abstract from the issue of imperfect substitutability. Caselli and Ciccone (2013) argue that consideration of imperfect substitution is unlikely to reduce the estimated importance of e¢ ciency gaps. ters s , r , and t . In particular, combining (1), (3), and an assumption that wages are proportional to the marginal productivity of labor, we obtain the "Mincerian"formulation
where w ij (s ij ; etc.) is the wage (years of schooling, etc.) of worker j in country i, and i is a country-speci…c term. 5 This suggests that using within-country variation in wages, schooling, health, and cognitive skills one might in principle identify the coe¢ cients .
In practice, there are severe limitations in following this strategy, that we discuss after introducing the data.
Data
I work with a sample of 128 countries for which I have data for y, k, s, and r, all observed in 2005. These data are an extract from a dataset I developed in Caselli (2016) , which contains details of construction and de…nitions. I treat the USA as the benchmark country.
Since all of the variables enter the calculations either as ratios or as di¤erences to US values, this e¤ectively means that there are 127 data points. When including test score estimates, the number of data points will drop to 54.
Per-worker income y i is variable rgdpwok from version 7.1 of the Penn World Tables   (PWT71) . World Bank (2012) presents cross-sectional estimates of the total capital stock, k, as 5 Note that this approach to the measurement of human capital is robust to a broad range of deviations from perfect competition. In particular, the wage does not need to equal the marginal productivity of labour, but just be proportional to it. Many models of monopsony in labor markets and monopolistic competition have this property. capital, but also land, timber, mineral deposits, and other items that are not included in standard national-account-based data sets. The basic strategy of the World Bank team that constructed these data begins with estimates of the rental ‡ows accruing from di¤erent types of natural capital, which are then capitalized using …xed discount rates. I construct the total capital measure by adding the variables producedplusurban and natcap.
Measuring the total capital stock as the sum of natural and reproducible capital amounts to an assumption of perfect substitutability between the two capital types. To evaluate this assumption, it is useful to conceive of GDP as the sum of the added values of the primary sector (essentially agriculture and mining), where natural capital is heavily used, and of the secondary and tertiary sectors (essentially manufacturing and services), where natural capital plays virtually no role. Then, perfect susbstitutability is most defensible if the primary sector uses little or no reproducible capital, or if the primary sector is a relatively small share of the economy. Admittedly, the former assumption is not particularly credible, while the latter clearly does not apply to many commodity-exporting If the primary sector is large, and reproducible capital plays a signi…cant role in the primary sector, reproducible capital and natural capital should boost each other's productivity, resulting in a larger capital bundle than in the case they are perfect substitutes. In other words, by assuming perfect substitutability we are underestimating the total contribution of commodity exporters than in the richer, benchmark country. Figure 2 shows total (reproducible plus natural) capital per worker relative to the US, k i =k U S , by relative-income decile. I.e., countries continue to be ranked by their relative income, as in Figure 1 , and not by their relative capital. The same format will be used in all subsequent …gures. The …gure shows that physical-capital gaps are broadly comparable to income gaps: average relative physical capital in the various income deciles tends to be of a similar order of magnitude as average relative income.
For average years of schooling in the working-age population (which is de…ned as between 15 and 99 years of age) I rely on Barro and Lee (2013) . Note from equation (3 Schooling gaps with the USA are very substantial. In countries in the bottom income decile the average workers has 9.2 fewer years of schooling. In the …fth decile, it is still 5.7
(though interestingly the 4th decile does a bit better, with 4.7). Remarkably, the schooling gap with the USA remains quite substantial even at the top, with each of the top three deciles showing a gap between 2.6 and 2.9 years.
As a proxy for the health status of the population, r, Weil (2007) proposes using the adult survival rate. The adult survival rate is a statistic computed from age-speci…c mortality rates at a point in time. It can be interpreted as the probability of reaching the age of 60, conditional on having reached the age of 15, at current rates of age-speci…c mortality. Since most mortality before age 60 is due to illness, the adult survival rate is a reasonably good proxy for the overall health status of the population at a given point in time. Relative to more direct measures of health, the advantage of the adult survival rate is that it is available for a large cross-section of countries. I construct the adult survival rate from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Speci…cally, this is the weighted average of male and female survival rates, weighted by the male and female share in the population.
-28.8 In Figure 4 I plot adult survival rate di¤erences with the USA. We observe the usual broadly-monotonic pattern, with countries in the bottom income deciles su¤ering from much lower survival rates: 16-year-olds in the 1st decile are almost 30 percentage points less likely to reach the age of 60 than US 16 years old. However, di¤erences in health appear to contract fairly rapidly as we move up the income distribution: they are less than 5 percentage points in the 5th and 7th decile, and they actually turn against the US in the top three deciles.
Following work by Gundlach, Rudman, and Woessman (2002) Needless to say measuring t by the above-described test scores is clearly very unsatis- Di¤erences in PISA scores are very signi…cant. In the third and fourth decile the gap between the average student and the average US student exceeds the standard deviation among OECD students. In the …fth and sixth deciles the gap is still similar to the OECD standard deviation. On the other hand countries in the top two income deciles outperform the US.
the science test for my baseline calculations. 8 Recall that I have complete data on income, physical capital, years of scholing, and survival rates for my smaple of 128 countries, but only 58 countries with test scores. This also implies that the decile averages in Figure 5 are typically based on a subset of the countries that populate the decile.
Calibration
The last, and most di¢ cult, step in producing counter-factual income gaps between US and Latin America is to calibrate the coe¢ cients s , r , and t . As discussed, equation (4) indicates that, using within country data on w, s, r, and t, one could in principle identify these coe¢ cients by running an extended Mincerian regression for log-wages. In implementing this plan, we are confronted with (at least) two important problems.
The …rst problem is that one of the explanatory variables, the adult survival rate r, by de…nition does not vary within countries. Estimating r directly is therefore a logical impossibility. To solve this problem Weil (2007) notices that, in the time series (for a sample of ten countries for which the necessary data is available), there is a fairly tight relationship between the adult survival rate and average height. In other words, he where r = c c .
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The second problem is that measures of t are not consistent at the macro and at the micro level. In particular, while we do have micro data sets reporting both results from tests of cognitive skills and wages, the test in question is simply a di¤erent test from the tests we have available at the level of the cross-section of countries. Call the alternative test available at the micro level d. Once again the solution is to assume a linear relationship
The di¤erence with the case of height-survival rate is that, as far as I know, there is no way to check the empirical plausibility of this assumption. Given the assumed linear relationship, one can back out d as the ratio of the within country standard deviation of 9 Needless to say if we had cross-country data on average height there would be no need to use the survival rate at all.
d ij and t ij . With d at hand, one can back out t from the modi…ed Mincerian regression
In choosing values for s , c , and d from the literature it is highly desirable to focus on microeconomic estimates of equation (5) that include all three right-hand variables. This is because s, c, and d are well-known to be highly positively correlated. 10 Hence, any OLS estimate of one of the coe¢ cients from a regression that omits one or two of the other two variables will be biased upward.
11
A search of the literature yielded one and only one study reporting all three coe¢ cients from equation (5). Vogl (2014) (2007) uses 0.65, on the basis of considerably higher estimates of the returns to height than those reported by Vogl. For the return to cognitive skills, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a) advocate 0.002, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than the value I derive from the Vogl's estimates.
14 The fact that the parameters calibrated on Vogl's estimates are smaller than those commonly used is consistent with the discussion above. In particular, the alternative estimates are often based on regressions that omit one or two of the variables in (5), and are therefore upward biased. Another consideration is that there is considerable crosscountry heterogeneity in the estimates, and that researchers often focus on estimates from the USA, which are often larger.
15;16
On the other hand, Vogl's regressions are admittedly estimated via OLS, and there is a real concern with attenuation bias from measurement error. In order to gauge the sensitivity of my results to possibly excessively low values of the calibration parameters due to attenuation bias, I will also present results based on an "aggressive" calibration, which uses a Mincerian return of 0.10, Weil's 0.65 value for the mapping of the adult survival rate to human capital, and Hanushek and Woessman's 0.002 coe¢ cient on the PISA test. to estimate the return to cognitive skills in a set of 13 countries. The value of 0.002 is the one for the USA. 15 For example, in Hanushek and Zhang (2009) , the estimated market return to cognitive skills varies (from minimum to maximum) by a factor of 10! The estimate from the USA, which is used in Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) is the maximum of this distribution. 16 This is actually an issue with the capital share as well. However, the issue there is less severe as observed capital shares do not vary systematically with y, so it should be possible to ascribe the observed variation to measurement error. In other words the patterns of variation in do not necessarily rise the issue of model mispeci…cation. 17 As described above the Hanushek and Zhang estimate for the US comes from a test d di¤erent from t. As the test-score results are only available for less than half of the countries in the sample, it is worth checking if including them in the construction of the human-capital measure makes a material quantitative di¤erence. Figure 6 compares human capital estimates with and without test scores, for the countries for which test scores are available, using my benchmark calibration. Speci…cally, for each decile the …rst bar shows average relative human capital computed as exp( s s i + r r i + t t i ), while the second bar shows exp( s s i + r r i ). Qualitatively, accounting for cognitive skills reduces relative human capital for countries with poorer test scores, and increases it for countries that score higher than the USA. This is, of course, by construction. The important point, however, is that
In order to go from their coe¢ cient d to the coe¢ cient of interest t we need to multiply the former by the ratio of the standard deviation of d U S;i to the standard deviation of t U S;i . Since Hanushek and Zhang standardize the variable d, we just have to multiply by the inverse of the standard deviation of t U S;i . But in the test we are using this is just 0.98, so the correction would be immaterial.
the di¤erences between accounting and not-accounting for cognitive skills is minuscule.
This is of course a consequence of the very small coe¢ cient on cognitive skills from Vogl's estimates.
In light of the very small di¤erence between relative human capital measures that account and do not account for cognitive skills, it does not seem worthwhile to give up on more than half of the sample to include cognitive skills in the measure of human capital -at least when using the benchmark calibration. From now on, therefore, my benchmark calculations will drop the test-score correction. Figure 7 shows relative human capital on the full sample. 
Results
My baseline results are presented in Figure 9 , which shows average counter-factual income (labeled "total capital") and e¢ ciency relative to the USA by income decile. Counter- factual income is computed as in (2). Relative e¢ ciency is, as usual, the residual. 18 The "total capital" bar is an inverse measure of the overall capital gap with the USA. The "relative e¢ ciency"bar is an inverse measure of the e¢ ciency gap with the USA.
The …gure points to a roughly 50-50 contribution of capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps to the overall income gap. There is a slight reversal in relative importance between the bottom-half of the income distribution, where e¢ ciency gaps are somewhat more signi…-cant, and the top, where capital gaps become somewhat more importance. But the di¤er-ences are small on both sides of the median, and the basic conclusion is that e¢ ciency and capital shortfalls are equally important in determining relative incomes. Quantitatively, the key observation is that poorer countries are exceptionally ine¢ cient users of their inputs: relative e¢ ciency is less than 10% in the bottom decile, less than 20% in the 2nd decile; just over 20% in the 3rd; about 30% in the fourth, etc.
18 Namely, relative e¢ ciency is (y i =y U S ) = (ỹ i =ỹ U S ). Figure 9 , but uses the aggressive calibration instead. Recall that when using the aggressive calibration, we have to include the cognitive-test scores and, as a consequence, we lose many observations. As expected, using larger parameters in the mapping from schooling years, health, and test scores leads to a considerable decline in relative capital. As a result, the relative contribution of capital gaps is now larger than the contribution of e¢ ciency gaps for all income deciles. Nevertheless, huge e¢ ciency gaps persist even under the aggressive calibration. The average e¢ ciency of the 3rd decile is 30%; in the 4th decile is less than 40%.
In order to fully appreciate the importance of these e¢ ciency gaps it is crucial to note that, under almost any imaginable set of circumstances, physical (speci…cally, reproducible) and human capital accumulation respond to a country's level of e¢ ciency. The higher A the higher the marginal productivity of capital, leading to enhanced incentives to invest in equipment and structure, schooling, etc. While quantifying this e¤ect is di¢ cult, most theoretical frameworks would lead one to expect it to be large. Hence, it is legitimate to conjecture that a signi…cant fraction of the capital gap may be due to the e¢ ciency gap.
6 Implications and Conclusions
There is huge inequality in income per worker between the countries of the World: countries in the bottom decile are about 100 times less productive than the USA, and substantial di¤erences persist all of the way up to the higher percentiles. A development-accounting calculation reveals that both capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps contribute roughly equally to this overall productivity gap. Hence, poor countries are poorer both because they exert less e¤ort in accumulating productive factors, and because they use these factors much less e¢ ciently. Reducing these e¢ ciency gaps would reduce overall productivity gaps both directly and indirectly, since much of the capital gap is likely due to the e¢ ciency gap itself: closing the e¢ ciency gap would stimulate investment at rates potentially capable of closing the capital gap as well.
These conclusions are contingent on the quality of the underlying macroeconomic data.
There is growing concern about the quality and reliability of the PPP national-account …gures in the Penn World Tables and similar data cross-country comparisons of levels reveal such gigantic di¤erences (as seen above) that they seem unlikely to be entirely dominated by noise. Still, exclusive reliance on these macro data is highly inadvisable.
Fortunately, it is also increasingly unnecessary. The increasing availability of …rm level data sets, particularly when matched with employee-level information (e.g. about schooling), provides an opportunity to supplement the macro picture with microeconomic 19 In principle, one might also argue for a reverse direction of causation, with larger physical and humancapital stocks leading to higher e¢ ciency. In particular, this would be true if the model was misspeci…ed, and there were large externalities. But as already mentioned the empirical literature has not to date uncovered signi…cant evidence of externalities in physical and human capital.
productivity estimates comparable across countries.
The bene…t of producing such micro productivity estimates is by no means limited to permitting to check the robustness of conclusions concerning average capital and e¢ ciency gaps -though this bene…t alone is su¢ cient to make such exercises worthwhile. An additional bene…t is to uncover information on the within country distribution of physical capital, human capital, and e¢ ciency. A relatively concentrated distribution would suggest that e¢ ciency gaps are mostly due to aggregate, macroeconomic factors that a¤ect all …rms fairly equally (e.g. impediment to technology di¤usion from other countries). A very dispersed distribution, with some …rms close to the world technology frontier, would be more consistent with allocative frictions that prevent capital and labor to ‡ow to the more e¢ cient/talented managers.
More generally, …rm-level data is likely to prove essential in the quest for the determinants of the large e¢ ciency gaps revealed by the development-accounting calculation.
After all, (in-)e¢ ciency is -by de…nition -a …rm-level phenomenon. Most of the most plausible possible explanations for the e¢ ciency gap are microeconomic in nature -whether it is about …rms unable to adapt technologies developed in more technologically-advanced countries, failures in the market for managers and/or capital, frictions in the matching process for workers, etc. It seems implausible that evidence for or against these mechanisms can be found in the macro data. Yet understanding the sources of poor countries' e¢ ciency gaps is unquestionably the most urgent task for those who want to design policies aimed at closing the income gaps.
